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Abstract
We study mixed-strategy equilibrium pricing in oligopoly settings where con-
sumers vary in the set of suppliers they consider for their purchase some being
captive to a particular rm, some consider two particular rms, and so on. In the
case of nested reachwe nd equilibria, unlike those in more standard models, in
which rms are ranked in terms of the prices they might charge. We character-
ize equilibria in the three-rm case, and contrast them with equilibria in the parallel
model with capacity constraints. A theme of the analysis is how patterns of consumer
interaction with rms matter for competitive outcomes.
1 Introduction
In settings where consumers vary in the set of suppliers they consider for their purchase,
how do competitive outcomes depend on the distribution of consideration sets in the con-
sumer population? The simplest situation in which this question arises is a duopoly in
which each rm has some captive customers, while non-captive customers are able to
choose whichever rms o¤er they like best. With more than two rms, richer patterns of
consideration become possible. Some consumers may be captive to particular rms, some
might consider the o¤ers of all rms, while others can choose among the o¤ers of various
subsets of rms. Competitive outcomes then depend not only on the number and rms
and their relative sizes, but also upon the pattern of consumer consideration of rms. The
main aim of this paper is to explore this issue in an otherwise standard setting where rms
compete in prices using mixed strategies.
There are various reasons why some consumers have more choices open to them than
others. Perhaps following a prior stage of advertising by rms or search by consumers,
Both authors at Department of Economics and All Souls College, University of Oxford. We are grateful
to Massimo De Francesco, Jon Levin, Vlad Nora, Neri Salvadori, and Jidong Zhou for helpful comments
on this draft.
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some might know about more suppliers than do other consumers. For instance, Honka et
al. (2017, Table 1) document di¤erent levels of consumer awareness of various retail banks
in a local market. Alternatively, as in Spiegler (2006), there might be horizontal product
di¤erentiation such that each consumer considers only a subset of products to be suitable.
The set of rms who are currently active in the market might be uncertain (Janssen and
Rasmusen (2002)) or the set of rms who choose to post price on a comparison website
might be uncertain (Baye and Morgan (2001)). Or some consumers might be constrained in
their choices by location, transport costs or switching costs. Consumers might also di¤er
in their ability to make comparisons between o¤ers, with confused consumers choosing
randomly between suppliers or buying from a default seller (Piccione and Spiegler (2012),
Chioveanu and Zhou (2013)). Our analysis does not take a view on the underlying reason
why some consumers have limited options. Rather, it takes the distribution of consideration
sets in the consumer population as given, and explores the consequences for competition.
A considerable literature has explored aspects of this question, and some settings are
well understood the case with symmetric sellers considered randomly, the case of inde-
pendent reach, and duopoly. As to the rst of these, Rosenthal (1980) and Varian (1980)
considered the situation in which some consumers are randomly, hence symmetrically, cap-
tive to particular rms, while others compare the o¤erings of all rms and buy from the
cheapest. There is a symmetric equilibrium with price dispersion, in which all rms choose
prices according to the same mixed strategy. Burdett and Judd (1983) analyze a more
general symmetric model, in which arbitrary fractions of consumers consider one random
rm, two random rms, and so on. Provided some consumers consider just one rm and
some consider more than one, the symmetric equilibrium involves price dispersion, and
industry prot is proportional to the number of captive consumers who consider just one
rm.
With independent reach, a consumer considering one rm does not a¤ect the probability
she considers any other rm. It follows that all possible subsets of rms are seen by some
consumers, in contrast to the all or nothing information structure in the Varian-type
models. Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994) study a model in which rms have asymmetric
independent reach.1 When reach is independent, the rm that reaches the most con-
1Manzini and Mariotti (2014) study a theoretical choice model, where an agent is aware of a particular
option with specied independent probability. In an empirical study of the personal computer market,
Sovinsky Goeree (2008) assumes that the reach of the various products is independent.
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sumers also has the largest proportion of captive consumers among the consumers within
its reach i.e., the highest captive-to-reach ratio. In the unique equilibrium they construct,
all rms have the same minimum price p0 in the range of prices that they might charge, but
the maximum price charged is lower for smaller rms. In the case of unit demands, each
rms prot is equal to its reach times p0, and p0 is equal to the captive-to-reach ratio of
the largest rm. The same is true in duopoly, as analyzed by Narasimhan (1988).2 In these
situations with symmetry, independent reach or duopoly, rms compete head-to-headin
price, in the sense that there are prices which all rms choose.
The aim of the present paper is to take further the analysis of asymmetric cases.3
In doing so, we discover equilibria with quite di¤erent characteristics from those in the
literature. In the case of nested reach, in which only the largest rm has any captive
customers, we nd equilibria with an overlapping duopoly property if the increments
between successive rm sizes are non-decreasing. There is a decreasing sequence of prices
fpkg such that the range of prices that the kth largest rm might charge is an interval
[pk 1; pk+1]. Hence small rms charge low prices while large rms charge high prices, so
that price competition is segmented instead of being head-to-head. It is no longer the case
that a rms prot is proportional to its reach.
The paper then provides a general analysis of the three-rm case. With triopoly, a
consumer who considers at least one rm could be in one of seven situations, there being
three one-rm possibilities, three two-rm possibilities, and one all-rm possibility. A wide
variety of patterns of consumer consideration is therefore possible. We state conditions
under which, as in the cases examined in the existing literature (e.g., independent reach),
each rms prot equals its reach multiplied by the captive-to-reach ratio of the largest rm.
(In some of those cases, however, we nd the novel feature that the price support of one
rm might not be an interval the rm might price high and low but not in an intermediate
range.) When, and only when, those conditions do not hold, we nd equilibria with the
overlapping duopoly property one rm prices low, one high, and one across the full
price range. The triopoly case also allows analysis of the competitive e¤ects of entry.
2In a companion paper, Armstrong and Vickers (2018), we use Narasimhans duopoly framework to
investigate the impact of rms being able to o¤er di¤erent deals to captive and contested customers.
3An important early example of an asymmetric model is Baye et al. (1992, Section V), where consumers
either consider a single rm or all rms, but rms have di¤erent numbers of captive customers. They show
that all but the two smallest rms choose the monopoly price for sure, while the two smallest rms compete
using mixed strategies as in the Narasimhan duopoly model. This is an extreme case of the situation where
large rms choose only high prices, which we discuss further at several points in the analysis to follow.
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While entry pushes down prices in some cases, there are natural patterns of competitive
interaction where, counter-intuitively, the opposite happens and consumers are harmed by
entry.
Another setting in which rms have limited reach is when they have capacity con-
straints, as in the classic Bertrand-Edgeworth model. For completeness, and for compari-
son with the model with consideration sets, section 5 presents the solution to the triopoly
version of the Bertrand-Edgeworth model in a simplied setting with unit demand. The
capacity model is somewhat easier to solve, since there is a clear-cut ordering of the rms
which is not always possible within the consideration set framework. When all rms have
some captive demand, each rm obtains the same prot per unit of capacity. Otherwise
the equilibrium involves the smallest rm choosing prices in an intermediate range, and
obtaining higher prot per unit of capacity than its larger rivals. In contrast to the con-
sideration set model, here price competition is always head-to-head. In addition, in the
capacity model it is not possible for entry by a third rm to harm consumers.
An extensive literature has explored equilibria in the Bertrand-Edgeworth model, which
often involve mixed strategies for prices see, for example, Vives (1999, section 5.2). The
duopoly case with unit demands is analysed in detail by Acemoglu et al. (2009, section
5), who also obtain bounds on equilibria in the n-rm case. In a richer framework with
downward-sloping demand, De Francesco and Salvadori (2013) study the situation where
all rms have captive demand. The closest papers to our triopoly analysis are Hirata (2009)
and De Francesco and Salvadori (2015), who showed how a small rm with small capacity
might be unwilling to price as low as larger rms, and obtain a higher prot per unit of
capacity than them.
The next section of the paper sets out the general model and shows how it operates
in the cases of duopoly, symmetry, and independent reach. Sections 3 and 4, respectively,
address the cases of nested reach and triopoly. Section 5 considers how our model of
consideration sets compares with the Bertrand-Edgeworth model of competition between
capacity-constrained rms. The main theme of the conclusion, in section 6, is that pat-
terns of consumer interaction with rms, and not just the number and sizes of rms, are
important for market outcomes. Possibilities for further work are also discussed.
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2 A framework
There are n rms that costlessly supply a homogeneous product. Consumers have unit
demand, and are willing to pay up to 1 to buy a unit of the product.4 Consumers di¤er
according to which rms they consider, and for each subset S  f1; :::; ng of rms suppose
that the fraction of consumers who consider exactly the subset S is S. (We slightly abuse
notation, and write 12 for the fraction of consumers who consider rms 1 and 2, 1 for the
fraction who consider only rm 1, and so on.) When there are only few rms the pattern of
consideration sets can be illustrated using a Venn diagram, and Figure 1 depicts a market
with three rms.5 (Here, a consumer considers a particular subset of rms if she lies inside
the circleof each of those rms. For instance, a fraction 12 of consumers consider the
two rms 1 and 2.)
Figure 1: Consideration sets with three rms
4The positive analysis which follows is not a¤ected if each consumer has a downward-sloping demand
function q(p), provided revenue R(p) = pq(p) is an increasing function up to the monopoly price. How-
ever, welfare analysis (for instance in our discussion of entry) requires adjustment with downward-sloping
demand. See Armstrong and Vickers (2018) for a welfare analysis with downward-sloping demand in the
duopoly context.
5With more rms, consideration sets can be conveniently depicted using a bipartite graph, where the
two groups in the graph are the consumers and the rms, and a line connecting a consumer to a rm
corresponds to the former considering the latter.
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A consumer is captive to rm i if she considers i but no other other rm, and there
are i such consumers. The reach of rm i, denoted i, is the fraction of consumers who
consider i; formally this is
i =
X
Sji2S
S :
Finally, the captive-to-reach ratio of rm i is denoted i, where
i =
i
i
:
At points in the following analysis we will discuss entry by a new rm. To model the
impact of entry on the pattern of consideration sets, we will assume the entrant has reach
which is a new circlesuperimposed onto the existing Venn diagram. That is, entry does
not a¤ect how consumers consider the incumbent rms, and the reach of an incumbent
rm is una¤ected by entry, although its number of captive customers will weakly fall.6
Likewise, when a rms reach increases we mean that its circleexpands, so that a larger
subset of consumers consider it, keeping the other rmsreaches unchanged.
Firms compete in one-shot Bertrand manner, and a consumer buys from the rm she
considers with the lowest price (provided this price is no greater than 1). We assume that
at least one rm has some captive customers, for otherwise the unique equilibrium has all
rms choosing the competitive price p = 0. Typically, there is no pure strategy equilibrium
in prices, and at least some rms will employ a mixed strategy for their prices.
When rm i chooses price p  1 it will sell to a consumer when that consumer is
within its reach and when none of the other rms the consumer considers o¤ers a lower
price. Therefore, when rival rms j 6= i choose price according to the CDF Fj(p), rm is
expected demand with price p  1 is
qi(p) 
X
Sji2S
S
0@Y
j2S=i
(1  Fj(p))
1A : (1)
Equilibrium occurs when each rm i obtains prot i, chooses price according to the CDF
Fi(p), and rm is prot pqi(p) is equal to i for every price in rm is support and no
higher than i for any price outside its support. Since industry prot is a continuous
function of the vector of prices chosen, Theorem 5 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) shows
that such an equilibrium exists.
6In particular, there is no danger of choice overload, whereby the fraction of consumers who compare
prices falls when there are more rms, as discussed for instance in Spiegler (2011, page 150).
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The following result collects a number of observations about the nature of equilibrium
which are mostly familiar from the existing literature.7
Lemma 1 In equilibrium:
(i) rm i obtains prot i  i, with equality for at least one rm;
(ii) rm i chooses prices with support contained in the interval [i; 1] and its distribution
for choosing price is continuous (that is, it has no atoms) in the half-open interval [i; 1);
(iii) the minimum price chosen by any rm, say p0, lies weakly between the second lowest
i and the highest i, and
(iv) each price in the interval [p0; 1] is chosen by at least two rms.
Sketch proof. In an equilibrium we have i  i, since a rm can always obtain at least
this prot by choosing price equal to 1 and serving its captive customers. For this reason,
no rm would ever o¤er a price below i, its captive-to-reach ratio, since if it did so it
would obtain prot below i even if it managed to sell to its entire reach. Since no rm
would choose a price above the reservation price 1, the price support for rm i lies in the
interval [i; 1].
To see that each rms distribution for price is continuous on the half-open interval
[i; 1), suppose by contrast rm i had an atom at some price p < 1 in its support. Then
rivals would have a jump in their demand across the price p and so none of them set a
price in some interval above p, and in that case rm i could increase its price somewhat
above p without losing any demand. This completes the proof for part (ii).
If a price is in one rms support it must be in the support of at least two rms. This
is because if only a single rm was active over a range of prices, say in the interval [p; p0],
then it loses no demand if it chooses the higher price p0 rather than p, and so this cannot
be part of an equilibrium. Similarly, if p0 is the minimum price ever chosen in the market,
then all prices in the interval [p0; 1] are sometimes chosen: if no rm is active in the interval
(p; p0)  [p0; 1], then a rm which sometimes chose p loses no demand if it instead chooses
price p0, and this cannot occur in equilibrium. (This latter argument makes use of the
previous observation that no rm has an atom has price p.) This proves part (iv).
Firms can have an atom at the reservation price p = 1. However, if rm i has an atom
at p = 1 its prot is i = i, i.e., when it chooses price p = 1 it sells only to its captive
7For instance, see McAfee (1994, page 28).
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customers and there can be no tieswith another rm who also has an atom at p = 1.
For instance, if both rms i and j have an atom at p = 1 then we must have ij = 0 so
that no consumers consider just these two rms, otherwise either rm has an incentive to
set a price strictly below 1. If no rm has an atom at p = 1 then any rm with p = 1 in its
support (and there must be at two such rms from part (iv)) has prot equal to i. This
completes the proof for part (i).
Let rm j be a rm which obtains prot equal to j. Then the minimum price ever
chosen, p0, must be no higher than j (for otherwise rm j could obtain more prot by
choosing p = p0), and so p0 cannot be strictly greater than the highest i. Since no rm
sets a price below its i, the minimum price p0 (which from part (iv) is sometimes chosen
by at least two rms) must be weakly above the second lowest i. This proves part (iii)
and completes the proof of the lemma.
As discussed in the introduction, previous work has studied the special cases of duopoly,
symmetry arising from random consideration, and independent reach, and we describe
those cases here for future reference. In the latter two situations we provide generalizations
to the existing analysis.
Duopoly: Lemma 1 essentially determines the unique equilibrium when there are two rms,
the situation studied by Narasimhan (1988). Suppose that rm 1 is the larger rm in the
sense that 1  2 (which implies that 1  2 and 1  2). Then both rms have the
same support for prices, [p0; 1], where p0 = 1, and rm i = 1; 2 has prot i = i1. Note
that the smaller rms prot weakly exceeds its captive prot 2. The larger rms prot
necessarily increases when its reach increases, as its prot is equal to its number of captive
customers which weakly increases. However, the smaller rms prot could fall with wider
reach, for instance if its captive base does not change but it expands su¢ ciently into the
rivals reach to become the larger rm.
Industry prot in equilibrium is
 = (1 + 2)1 = 1 + 2   12   12
2
1
: (2)
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Total welfare is the number of consumers reached, W = 1+2 12, which must increase
whenever a rms reach expands. Consumer surplus therefore
CS = W    = 122
1
:
Thus, keeping reaches constant, consumer surplus increases when the overlap 12 is larger,
even though fewer consumers are then served. Likewise, consumer surplus decreases when
the larger rms set of captive customers expands, keeping the other regions of the Venn
diagram unchanged, even though more consumers are served.
Symmetric rms: Burdett and Judd (1983, section 3.3) study a market with n  2 sym-
metric rms, where consumers consider rms at random (a specied fraction consider one
random rm, another fraction consider two random rms, and so on). This model can
be generalised so that rms are symmetric but consideration sets need not be random.
Specically, suppose that each rm reaches a0 captive customers, a1 consumers who con-
sider exactly one other rm (not necessarily random), and in general for m  n   1 each
rm reaches am consumers who consider m other rms. Thus, the reach of each rm is
 = a0 + ::: + an 1, and the captive-to-reach ratio is  = a0= which is therefore the
minimum price o¤ered in the market. Each rm obtains equilibrium prot equal to a0.
Figure 2: Local competition
To illustrate, suppose there are four symmetric rms with a pattern of consideration
as depicted on Figure 2. Thus, no consumers consider three or four rms (i.e., a2 = a3 =
0), each rm has the same number of captive customers, and a rm overlaps with two
neighbours but not with the third more distant rival. This situation could be described as
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one with local competition between rms, and there is no head-to-head competition for a
pool of consumers who consider all rms.
In a symmetric market, the symmetric equilibrium where each rm uses the same CDF
for its price, F (p), is derived as follows. Let
(x)  a0 + a1x+ a2x2 + :::+ an 1xn 1
be the probability generating function associated with the random variable m, the number
of rivals faced by a rm. Here, (x) is convex and increasing, the number of captive
customers for each rm is (0), each rm has reach is  = (1) and captive-to-reach ratio
 = (0)=(1). The probability a rm which chooses price p will sell to a consumer is
therefore
a0 + a1(1  F (p)) + :::+ an 1(1  F (p))n 1 = (1  F (p)) :
Therefore, since each rm makes prot (0), the symmetric equilibrium CDF satises
(1  F (p))  (0)
p
; (3)
where F (p) is a function which strictly increases from 0 to 1 as p increases from  to 1.
The models in Rosenthal (1980) and Varian (1980) are a special case of this symmetric
framework, where consumers either consider one random rm or consider all rms, so that
am = 0 for 1  m  n   2. With this all-or-nothingpattern of consideration, Baye,
Kovenock, and De Vries (1992) show that when n  3 there are multiple equilibria (all
of which involve the same prot for rms). For instance, all but two rms might choose
p = 1 for sure, selling only to their captive customers, while the remaining two rms choose
prices on the interval [; 1]. If a1 > 0, however, so that a rm sometimes has exactly one
rival, one can adapt the proof of Proposition 1 in Spiegler (2006) to show that the strategy
in (3) is the only equilibrium.
In general, the symmetric model is not well-suited to study the impact of entry. How-
ever, if entry occurs in such a way as to preserve symmetry between rms, then it cannot
harm consumers. The entrant will obtain prot equal to its captive customers (i.e., its
customers which did not previously consider any incumbent), which in turn is equal to the
gain in welfare due to entry. Therefore, the gain in consumer surplus due to entry is equal
to the reduction in incumbent prot, and incumbents cannot gain since entry must weakly
shrink each incumbents set of captive customers.
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Independent reach: Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994) study the situation where each
rm has an independent chance of being considered by a consumer. Specically, rm i
is considered by an independent fraction i of the consumer population, where rms are
labelled so that 1  2  :::  n. The fraction of consumers who are captive to rm
i is i = ij 6=i(1   j) and so this rms captive-to-reach ratio is i = j 6=i(1   j).
Thus, as with duopoly, the rm with the largest reach is also the rm with the highest
captive-to-reach ratio.
If rm j chooses its price with the CDF Fj(p), rm i sells to a consumer if it reaches
that consumer (which occurs with probability i) and no rival reaches that consumer with
a lower price. The probability that rm j does reach the consumer with a lower price is
jFj(p). Therefore, rm is demand with price p takes the multiplicatively separable form
qi(p) = i
Y
j 6=i
(1  jFj(p)) : (4)
Ireland (1993) and McAfee (1994) show that the equilibrium is such that all rms have the
same minimum price p0, which is therefore equal to 1 = 
n
j=2(1   j), and the prot of
rm i is i = ip0. In particular, unless it is the largest rm, a rms equilibrium prot
decreases with its reach i when i  1=2.
Thus, rmsprots are proportional to their reaches, the prot of the largest rm is
equal to its number of captive consumers, while the prot of smaller rms is weakly greater
than their number of captive consumers. The CDFs which support these equilibrium prots
are such that rm i chooses its price with interval support [p0; pi], where rm is maximum
price pi is smaller for smaller rms. The two largest rms choose prices with support
[p0; 1].8 Thus smaller rms only o¤er low prices, while larger rms o¤er the full range of
prices.
With independent reach, industry prot is
 =

nP
i=1
i

p0 =

nP
i=1
i

nQ
i=2
(1  i) : (5)
Total welfare is the fraction of consumers who see at least one rm, which is
W = 1 
nQ
i=1
(1  i) : (6)
8This equilibrium was subsequently shown by Szech (2011) to be unique.
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The di¤erence between W and  is consumer surplus, which is therefore
CS = 1 

1 +
nP
i=2
i

nQ
i=2
(1  i) : (7)
Expression (7) can be interpreted as an index of the competitivenessof the market in
this context. Consumer surplus does not depend on the reach of the largest rm, 1, but
increases with the reach of each smaller rm. One can readily verify that entry by a new
rm, also with independent reach, will necessarily increase consumer surplus in (7).
This analysis of Ireland and McAfee can be extended to situations where reach is con-
ditionally independentin the following sense. Suppose some consumers are systematically
harder to reach than others, and one rm being considered by a given consumer makes it
more likely that another rm is also considered by that consumer. Specically, suppose
that consumers di¤er according to a scalar parameter , interpreted as the reachability
of the consumer, and the type- consumer considers rm i with independent probability
i, where 1  2  :::  n. Thus the reach of rm i is i = i  E[]. Then similarly
to expression (4), rm is demand with price p is
qi(p) = E
(
i
Y
j 6=i
[1  jFj(p)]
)
:
The construction of Ireland and McAfee continues to be valid, and in equilibrium all rms
have the same minimum price (equal to the captive-to-reach ratio of the largest rm),
and smaller rms progressively drop out with higher prices. (See Proposition 2 for further
details in the case of three rms.)
In each of these cases of duopoly, symmetry and independence, the format of the
equilibrium is similar: all rms choose their price from an interval support, all rms have
the same minimum price p0, and as a result a rms prot is proportional to its reach. All
rms compete head-to-headin prices, in the sense that there is a range of prices that all
rms choose. This is so even if they do not compete head-to-headin terms of consumer
consideration, as with local competition in Figure 2. In the remainder of the paper we
show that richer possibilities exist outside these special cases. We start in the next section
by describing a radically di¤erent kind of equilibrium when rms have nested reach.
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3 Nested reach
The situation with independent reach has all consumers being equally likely to be reached
by a rm, regardless of which other rms they consider. At the other extreme one could
envisage consideration sets as being nested, in the sense that if rm i reaches a greater
number of consumers than rm j, all rm js consumers also consider rm i. For example,
an entrants reach lies inside an incumbents reach if only a subset of latters existing
customers are willing to consider buying from the entrant. Likewise, if consumers consider
options in an ordered fashion, as may be the case with internet search results (where
some consumers just consider the rst result, others consider the rst two, and so on),
then the reach of a lower ranked option is nested inside that of a higher ranked option.
Alternatively, if consumers only consider the rms whose product they nd suitable, then
low-quality rms could supply a product which is found suitable by only a subset of the
consumers who like the product of a higher-quality rm. With nested reach only the largest
rm has any captive consumers, and a smaller rm only has positive demand if its price is
below all the prices of larger rms.
Figure 3: Three rms with nested reach
As depicted on Figure 3, suppose there are n  3 rms with nested reach, let rm i have
reach i, where rms are ordered as 1 < 2 < ::: < n, and for i  2 write i = i   i 1
for the incremental reach of rm i. While it is hard to nd the equilibrium in all nested
situations, the following result describes equilibrium in a broad class of cases.
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Proposition 1 Suppose n  3 rms have nested reach such that
0 < 2  :::  n : (8)
Then there are price thresholds p1 < p2 < ::: < pn 1 < pn = 1 such that only sellers i
and i + 1 (where 1  i < n) choose prices in the interval [pi; pi+1]. The thresholds are
determined recursively by p2 =
1+2
2
p1 and for 1 < i < n
pi+1 = pi +
i
i+1
pi 1 (9)
and the prot of rm i is i = ipi.
Proof. This and subsequent proofs are contained in the appendix.
Thus, in this equilibrium smaller rms only choose low prices while larger rms only
choose high prices.9 In this sense there is segmented price competition rather than head-
to-head price competition, even though there is head-to-head competition in terms of
consumer consideration (as rm 1s potential customers consider all rms). Nevertheless,
the presence of large rms a¤ects the prots of smaller rms, and (except for the very
largest rm) vice versa. To illustrate, suppose that 1 = 2 = ::: = n   so that reach
is equally spaced. Then expression (9) implies that pi+1 = pi + pi 1, so that pi = p1  'i
where 'i is the i
th number in the Fibonacci sequence (as given by 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13,...). Since
pn = 1, it follows that the lowest price is p1 = 1='n, in which case pi = 'i='n and the
prot of rm i is i = 'i='n.
Proposition 1 describes equilibrium only for cases where incremental reach increases. As
shown in the next section, other pricing patterns are found in other congurations of nested
reach, including patterns akin to independent reach where all rms have the same minimum
price and have prot proportional to reach. In all the asymmetric cases considered so far
(duopoly, independent reach, and nested reach) there is a clear-cut ordering of the rms,
in the sense that a rm with a larger reach also has a weakly higher captive-to-reach
9A similar pattern of segmented pricing is seen in Bulow and Levin (2006). They study a matching
model where n heterogeneous rms each wish to hire a single worker from a pool with n heterogeneous
workers, where the payo¤ from a match is (in the simplest version of their model) the product of qualities
of the rm and worker. Firms choose wages which they must pay regardless of the quality of the worker
eventually hired, workers care only about their wage, and higher quality workers choose their employer
rst. In equilibrium, rms o¤er wages according to mixed strategies, where higher quality rms o¤er wages
in a higher range than lower quality rms.
14
ratio. However, more generally the two ways to order rms need not always coincide. For
instance, a nicherm could have limited reach but have a high proportion of its reach
being captive. In the next section we allow for general patterns of awareness in the context
of triopoly.
4 Triopoly
In this section we analyze equilibria in all situations when there are three rms in the
market. As shown on Figure 1, rm i = 1; 2; 3 has i captive consumers, ij consumers
consider rms i and j (but not k), while to save on notation we say that  consumers
consider all three rms. Unless explicitly stated, all parts of this Venn diagram have
positive numbers of consumers. When rms use the CDFs fF1(); F2(); F3()g for their
prices, expression (1) implies that rm is expected demand with price p  1 is
qi(p) = i + ij(1  Fj(p)) + ik(1  Fk(p)) + (1  Fj(p))(1  Fk(p)) (10)
where i; j and k are distinct. If i is rm is equilibrium prot, then for a price p in rm is
support we require that pqi(p)  i, and that pqi(p)  i for all prices outside its support.
We will show that equilibria in this market take one of three broad formats, as presented
in the next proposition. In the rst, all rms are active for low prices (where the lowest
price is equal to the highest captive-to-reach ratio), and above a threshold price only two
rms are active. (The case with independent reach falls into this format.) In the second
format we again have all rms active for low prices, but now one rm has a gap in its price
support and does not choose prices in an intermediate range. In the third format, two
rms are willing to choose prices which are below what the other rm is willing to charge,
and prots are no longer proportional to reach. This is the situation with overlapping
duopolies, already seen with nested reach in Proposition 1.
To characterise these equilibria is it useful to dene the three parameters
ti = ( + jk)i ; (11)
where, in words, ti is the probability that a consumer considers at least rms j and k
multiplied by the probability she considers rm i. In rough terms, the format of equi-
librium depends on how close together the parameters ft1; t2; t3g are. To illustrate, with
independent reach we have
t1 = t2 = t3 = 123 ; (12)
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with nested reaches 1 > 2 > 3 we have
t1 = 13 ; t2 = t3 = 23 ; (13)
while in the model in Baye et al. (1992, Section V), where no consumer considers exactly
two rms, we have
t1 = 1 ; t2 = 2 ; t3 = 3 : (14)
The following result characterizes the equilibria for all parameter values in Figure 1.
(For a precise description of the threshold prices in the statement of the result, see the
proof in the appendix.)
Proposition 2 Suppose rms are labelled so that rm 1 has the highest captive-to-reach
ratio, 1, while rms 2 and 3 are labelled so that
123(1   3)  132(1   2) : (15)
(i) If
 + 12
12
jt1   t2j  123 (16)
there is an equilibrium where all rms choose the same minimum price p0 = 1, each rm
is prot is i  p0, and there is a price p1, with p0 < p1  1, such that all rms choose
prices in the lower range [p0; p1] and only rms 1 and 2 choose prices in the upper range
[p1; 1].
(ii) If
jt1   t2j < 123 <  + 12
12
jt1   t2j (17)
there is an equilibrium where all rms choose the minimum price p0 = 1, rm is prot
is i  p0, and there are prices p^ and p1, with p0 < p^ < p1 < 1, such that all rms choose
prices in the low range [p0; p^], rm 3 and one of the other rms (whichever of rms 1 and 2
has the lower ti) choose prices in the middle range [p^; p0], and rms 1 and 2 choose prices
in the upper range [p1; 1].
(iii) If
123  jt1   t2j (18)
there is an equilibrium with prices p0 and p1, where p0 < p1  1 and p0 is below 1, such
that rm 3 and one of the other rms (whichever has the lower ti) choose prices in the
lower range [p0; p1] and rm 1 and one of the other rms (rm 2 if t2  t1 and otherwise
the rm with the larger i) choose prices in the upper range [p1; 1].
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Clearly independent reach, where we have (12), is covered by part (i) of this result.
More generally, part (i) applies whenever t1 = t2 = t3, as is so with the conditional
independencediscussed in section 2 when we have
t1 = t2 = t3 = 123
 
E[]E[2]

= 123
E[2]
(E[])2
:
As the ti parameters become less similar, part (ii) of the result will apply. In technical
terms, when the ti parameters are relatively far apart, when one attempts to construct
the equilibrium CDFs as in part (i) of the result, the candidate CDF of the rm with
the largest ti will be decreasing over an intermediate range, in which case the appropriate
CDF for this rm will be the ironedversion of the candidate CDF, and the at portion
corresponds to the high-ti rm ceasing to choose intermediate prices. Note that part (ii)
of the result cannot apply if  = 0, and so there must be head-to-head competition for a
pool of consumers who consider all rms for this pricing pattern to emerge.
As the ti parameters become further apart, this intermediate range of prices becomes
wider and eventually this high-ti rm ceases to o¤er low prices at all, and the equilibrium
format has one rm only o¤ering low prices, one rm only o¤ering high prices (and the
remaining rm choosing prices throughout the whole range). This regime is covered by
part (iii). For instance, with nested reach 1 > 2 > 3 and (13), rms are labelled as in
the statement of the Proposition, and part (iii) applies if (18) holds, i.e., if the incremental
reach of the largest rm is at least as great as that of the medium rm, thus verifying
Proposition 1. Otherwise, the nested case has all three rms choosing the same minimum
price.10 Another case which is covered by part (iii) of the result is the model in Baye et al.
(1992, Section V), where the largest rm chooses price p = 1 for sure (i.e., in the statement
of the result we have p1 = 1), and the two smaller rms compete in the range [2; 1].
The impact of entry: As an application of this analysis, consider the following simple entry
scenario. Initially, there are two rms, 1 and 2, who together cover the market, i.e., all
consumers consider one or both of these rms. Suppose rm i reaches a proportion i of
the consumers, where rms are labelled so that 1  2. Since they cover the market,
1 + 2   1  0 consumers consider both rms, while rm i has 1  j captive customers.
10Part (ii) applies if the nested reaches satisfy (1   2)(2   3) < (2   3)2 < 2(1   2), as is the
case in the example with reaches proportional to 1 = 12, 2 = 9 and 3 = 5.
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Expression (2) shows that industry prot is
(1 + 2)
1  2
1
;
while consumer surplus is one minus this prot.
Now suppose a third rm, rm 3, enters this market with independent reach , i.e.,
it is considered with probability  by all consumers, regardless of whether they already
consider rm 1 or rm 2 or both incumbents. Since rm 3 has no captive customers, rm
1 has the highest captive-to-reach ratio. One can calculate that
t1 = t2 = 12 ; t3 = (1 + 2   1) ;
so that the entrant has the smallest ti. One can check that either part (i) or (ii) of
Proposition 2 applies, and the minimum price is p0 =
(1 2)(1 )
1
. Therefore, the change in
industry prot due to entry is
(1 + 2 + )
(1  2)(1  )
1
  (1 + 2)1  2
1
=   
1
(1  2) ( + 1 + 2   1) < 0 :
Thus an entrant with independent reach intensies competition, so that industry prot
falls and consumers benet.
Alternatively, suppose that the entrant is considered only by those consumers who
already consider both incumbents, as illustrated by the Venn diagram on Figure 4. This
consideration pattern is reasonable if only savvy consumers consider buying from the
entrant, and these are the consumers who are already willing to consider both incumbents.
In many cases, but not all, this form of entry will increase industry prot: by construction,
the entrant does not cut into the incumbentscaptive markets, and so the incumbents will
often be able to maintain their prots, while the entrant makes positive prot. When this
is so, consumers are harmed by this pattern of entry.
This is true if the incumbents are symmetric, when part (i) applies to the post-entry
market. The minimum price is equal to an incumbents captive-to-reach ratio, which is
unchanged with entry. Since the sum of the rmsreaches increases with entry, it follows
the industry prot rises and consumer surplus falls. Although their prot is una¤ected by
entry, incumbents adjust their pricing strategy to focus more on exploiting their captive
base, so that captive customers pay higher prices after entry. In addition, it is perfectly
possible that even the contested consumers are harmed by this form of entry, despite being
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able to choose among more rms, as the higher prices o¤ered by incumbents leave the
entrant relatively unconstrained to set high prices too.11
Figure 4: Entry into the contested market
This result is related to Rosenthal (1980), where entry by a new rm causes the average
price paid by both captive and informed consumers to rise. However, in his model the
entrant arrives with its own pool of captive customers, whereas the e¤ect arise in our
model despite the entrant having none.12
5 Capacity constraints
As discussed in the introduction, another way in which rms have limited reach is when
they have capacity constraints, as in the Bertrand-Edgeworth model of competition. A
natural question is how equilibria in this scenario compare with equilibria in our main
model with consideration sets. To address this question in the most direct way we assume
that consumers have unit demands, which avoids the need to posit a rationing rule. As we
11To calculate expected prices paid by di¤erent consumers in the Venn diagram requires detailed analysis
using the equilibrium CDFs for the rmsmixed pricing strategies. To illustrate, suppose symmetric
incumbents each have equal numbers of captive and contested customers. Then before entry the average
captive price is about 0.69 and the average price paid by a contested customer is 0.61. If entry occurs and
the entrant is considered by all the contested customers, the captive customers now pay an average price
0.91 while the contested customers pay 0.67.
12Relatedly, in a setting with di¤erentiated products, Chen and Riordan (2008) show how entry to a
monopoly market can induce the incumbent to raise its price. For instance, entry by generic pharmaceuti-
cals might cause a branded incumbent to raise its price, as it prefers to focus on those captive customers
who care particularly about its brand. Closer to the consideration set framework is Chen and Riordan
(2007), who study a model with symmetric rms, where consumers either consider a single random rm or
consider a random pair of rms. Among other results, they show that the equilibrium price can increase
when an additional rm enters.
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explain, for some congurations of capacities, equilibria in the Bertrand-Edgeworth model
resemble those that arise in a model with consideration sets. But for other congurations
they are quite unlike any such equilibria.
Suppose there is a continuum population of identical consumers of measure 1 who each
consider all prices and are willing to pay 1 for a unit of homogeneous product. There
are n  2 rms, where rm i can costlessly supply any quantity up to its capacity i
(but cannot supply beyond this capacity), and where rms are labelled 1  :::  n. A
consumer tries to buy at the lowest available price, but is not always able to do so: once
the capacity of the cheapest rm is exhausted, remaining consumers then try to buy from
the second cheapest rm, and so on. Write
 =
nP
i=1
i   1
for the excess of total capacity over demand. We assume  > 0, otherwise there is no
competition between rms and the equilibrium price for each rm is p = 1. Here,minfi; 1g
is rm is supply when it o¤ers a price below all its rivals, and so plays the role reachdid
in our main model with consideration sets. Firm is supply if it o¤ers a higher price than
all its rivals is 1 j 6=ij if this is positive, and this represent the rms captive customers.
Firm i has captive customers if and only if i > , and we assume from now on that 1 > 
(otherwise equilibrium involves all rms choosing the competitive price p = 0). Unlike our
framework with consideration sets, here rms are necessarily ordered so that rms with
large reach also have a large captive-to-reach ratio.
With appropriate interpretation of the captive-to-reach ratio, Lemma 1 continues to
hold. Equilibrium in this capacity framework is easily derived in the special case where all
rms weakly have captive customers, i.e., when n  .13 (An example of this case is when
rms are symmetric and each has capacity , where (n  1) < 1 < n.) In this situation,
the only way that a rm cannot supply its entire capacity is when all rivals choose a lower
price. (If rm j sets a higher price that rm i, the latter rms residual demand is at least
1   k 6=i;jk which exceeds i given that rm j has captive demand.) Therefore, when
rms use CDFs fF1(); :::; Fn()g, rm is supply when it chooses price p is
si(p) = i   
Q
j 6=i
Fj(p) : (19)
13This case is discussed in detail in De Francesco and Salvadori (2013).
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It follows that all rms have the same minimum price p0 in equilibrium. To see this,
suppose that rm i has the smallest minimum price of the n rms, p0, and so makes prot
p0i. Then for another rm js lowest price, m say, we have
p0i = p0si(p0)  msi(m) = m[i   
Q
k 6=i
Fk(m)] = mi
where the inequality follows since rm i could choose price m but this cannot increase
its prot above p0i, while the nal equality follows since m is rm js lowest price. We
deduce that all rms have the same minimum price, which is necessarily equal to rm 1s
captive-to-reach ratio, p0 = (1   )=1. This then determines the rmsprots uniquely
as i = ip0 for i = 1; :::; n. As with the case of independent reach discussed in section 2,
which closely resembles this situation with capacity constraints, these equilibrium prots
are supported by CDFs such that rm i chooses its price with interval support [p0; pi],
where rm is maximum price pi is smaller for smaller rms. The two largest rms choose
prices with support [p0; 1]. Thus smaller rms only o¤er low prices, while larger rms o¤er
the full range of prices. (See part (i) of Proposition 3 below for derivation of this in the
case of triopoly.)
Another straightforward situation is when 1  1, so that one rm on its own has
su¢ cient capacity to serve all demand.14 In this case, a smaller rm either has no demand
(if rm 1 o¤ers a lower price) or can supply its entire capacity (if rm 1s price is higher).
It follows that when rms use CDFs fF1(); :::; Fn()g, the supply functions are
s1(p) = 1  2F2(p)  :::  nFn(p)
si(p) = i(1  F1(p)) for i = 2; :::; n :
As in the previous situation where all rms have captive customers, each rm obtains prot
i = ip0, where p0 = 1    is the largest rms captive-to-reach ratio.15
Other situations are signicantly more complicated, and to make further progress sup-
pose as in section 4 there are three rms. Suppose also that 1 < 1 so that no single rm
14This situation is discussed as Case 1 in Hirata (2009)
15Even if 1 > 1 the large rm can only ever supply quantity 1, and so its reach is 1. Although prots
are uniquely determined, the CDFs of the smaller rms are not pinned down uniquely, and together merely
need to satisfy
2F2(p) + :::+ nFn(p) = 1  1   
p
:
This scenario where one rm has enough capacity serve all demand is isomorphic to a model with consid-
erations sets, where one rm is considered by all consumers and smaller rms do not overlap in their reach
(i.e., all consumers either consider only the large rm or the large rm and one other rm).
21
can supply all demand. Then rm is expected supply with price p  1 is
si(p)  Fj(p)Fk(p) minf0; 1  j   kg+ (1  Fj(p))(1  Fk(p))i
+(1  Fj(p))Fk(p) minfi; 1  kg+ Fj(p)(1  Fk(p)) minfi; 1  jg ; (20)
where i, j and k are distinct and Fj and Fk are the CDFs of its two rivals. For instance, if
rm j undercuts rm i and rm k does not, rm i can supply the residual demand 1  j
or its capacity i, whichever is the smaller. Note that i  1   j if and only if rm
k (weakly) has some captive customers. If i is rm is equilibrium prot, equilibrium
requires that psi(p) = i for any price in rm is support, and psi(p)  i for any price
outside its support.
The proof of the following result describes equilibrium for all parameter values. (For a
precise description of the threshold prices in the statement of the result, see the proof in
the appendix.)
Proposition 3 Assume three rms have capacities 0 < 3  2  1 < 1.
(i) If 3   or if 2 = 3 then all rms have the same minimum price p0 and obtain
prots i = p0i, where
p0 = 1  
1
(21)
is rm 1s captive-to-reach ratio. Firms 1 and 2 choose prices in the interval [p0; 1] while
rm 3 chooses price in the lower interval [p0; p1] where p1  1.
(ii) If 3 < minf; 2g then rms 1 and 2 choose prices in the interval [p0; 1] and obtain
prot i = p0i, where p0 is given in (21), while rm 3 obtains prot 3 > p03 and chooses
its price in an interior range [p^; p1], where p0 < p^ < p1 < 1.
In contrast to the consideration set framework, where segmented price competition of
the overlapping duopolyform was sometimes seen, here rms always compete head-to-
head in prices. All rms o¤er prices in a lower price range when part (i) applies, while all
rms o¤er prices in an intermediate range under part (ii). Likewise, here rms each o¤er
prices from an interval, while with consideration sets a rm might choose high and low
prices but not intermediate prices.
Unlike the model with consideration sets, here it is not possible that entry into a
duopoly market can harm consumers. To see this, consider two incumbents, 1 and 2, with
respective capacities 1 and 2  1. If 1 + 2  1 then there is no competition between
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these rms, consumers have zero surplus, and entry can only improve consumer surplus.
Suppose then that 1 + 2 > 1 (and that 1 < 1), in which case industry prot without
entry is
(1 + 2)
1  2
1
:
Suppose a third rm enters, with capacity 3. Since demand was already met, entry
leaves welfare unchanged and consumers are harmed if and only industry prot rises. If
3  1  2 then no rm has any captive customers after entry, equilibrium price is p  0
and consumers benet from entry. Otherwise, if 3 < 1 2 rm 1 has captive demand but
rm 3 does not, so that part (ii) of Proposition 3 applies, with minimum price p0 = 1 2 31 .
If 3 denotes the entrants prot, the change in prot due to entry is
(1 + 2)p0 + 3   (1 + 2)1  2
1
= 3   31 + 2
1
:
However, the entrant cannot make prot greater than 3 (which is the prot if it supplies
its capacity at price p = 1), and so the change in prot is negative and consumers benet
from entry.
Unlike our main model with consideration sets, in the capacity framework our as-
sumption of unit demand makes a signicant di¤erence to and simplies the analysis.
De Francesco and Salvadori (2015) have studied triopoly in the richer and more complex
situation where aggregate demand is downward sloping (such that revenue is concave),
under the assumption of an e¢ cient rationing rule, and show that additional possibilities
can then arise in equilibrium. For example, the smallest rm might have an atom at its
maximum price, with the result that the two larger rm do not choose prices immediately
above this maximum price and there are gaps in the set of prices o¤ered in the market.16
6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to explore, in a parsimonious framework with price-setting
rms and homogeneous products, how patterns of consumer consideration matter for com-
petitive outcomes. Di¤erent patterns of consideration not only yield di¤erent levels of equi-
librium prots and consumer surplus, they can also determine pricing patterns in terms of
which rms are direct price competitors. In this regard a distinction has emerged between
16They also nd a conguration where the middle rm only chooses high prices, which is not possible
with unit demand.
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settings in which all rms are direct price competitors, and more segmented settings in
which some rms always price high and others price low.
The former pricing pattern was a feature of the cases of duopoly, symmetry and in-
dependent reach discussed in Section 2. The equilibrium prot of each rm was its reach
multiplied by the highest captive-to-reach ratio, and rms were direct competitors in the
sense that there was a range of (low) prices that all rms might choose in equilibrium.
With independent reach, however, only larger rms would ever choose prices higher than
that range. The same is true in triopoly with parameters that accord with cases (i) or (ii)
of Proposition 2. Case (ii), though, had the interesting feature of a middle range of prices
that one of the rms would never o¤er.
A quite di¤erent pattern of prots and prices was found with nested reach (under the
conditions of Proposition 1) and in case (iii) of the triopoly analysis. Some rms then
make less prot than their reach multiplied by the highest captive-to-reach ratio, and
price segmentation arises. In particular, there is no range of prices that all rms might
charge: some only ever price high and some only ever price low. Nevertheless, the presence
of the rms that price high bears down on the prices that lower-pricing rms charge in
equilibrium.
The analysis of capacity-constrained price competition showed no such distinction, at
least with three suppliers and unit demand, when there was always a range of prices o¤ered
by all rms. However, when one rm is small in the sense of part (ii) of Proposition 3,
that rm prices only in a middle range, and its prot per unit of capacity exceeds that of
the other rms, in contrast to any situation that arose in triopoly in the consideration set
model. More generally, the consideration set model allows for richer patterns of competitive
interaction than the capacity model. For instance, in the former scenario one rms reach
can lie inside anothers, entry can leave the number of captives customers una¤ected, it
is possible for small rms to have a high proportion of captive customers, and a rm can
have di¤erent overlaps with similar-sized rivals, while none of these features can happen in
the capacity model.
Our analysis has taken as given the structure of consideration sets (and capacities),
though we have considered some e¤ects of market entry. This provides a basis for more
general analysis that endogenizes patterns of competition by way of, for example, adver-
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tising and other marketing e¤orts by rms, and search by consumers.17 A theme of such
analysis will be that the protability of advertising, say, depends on how it a¤ects patterns
of consumer awareness. For example, greater awareness of a rms product might mean
less prot for the rm, not more.
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Technical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We construct an equilibrium of the stated form. The prot of the largest rm n is
n = n, its number of captive customers, and denote the prot of smaller rms by i.
In the highest interval [pn 1; 1] used by the two largest rms, these rms are sure to be
undercut by all smaller rivals, and so in this price range their CDFs must satisfy
n + n 1(1  Fn 1(p)) =
n
p
; n 1(1  Fn(p)) =
n 1
p
:
Since Fn(pn 1) = 0 it follows that pn 1 and n 1 are related as
n 1 = n 1pn 1 :
We have Fn 1(1) = 1, while the largest rm has an atom at p = 1 with probability
1  Fn(1) = n 1=n 1 = pn 1.
In the lowest interval [p1; p2] used by the two smallest rms, these rms are sure to
undercut all larger rivals, and so in this range their CDFs must satisfy
2 + 1(1  F1(p)) =
2
p
; 1(1  F2(p)) = 1
p
and since F1(p1) = F2(p1) = 0 it follows that
1 = 1p1 ; 2 = (1 + 2)p1 :
Since F1(p2) = 1 we have 2 = 2p2, which combined with the previous expression for 2
implies that
p2 =
1 + 2
2
p1 : (22)
If there are just three rms, these are the two price intervals in the equilibrium. With
more than three rms there are intermediate intervals, and in the interval [pi; pi+1], where
1 < i < n   1, rms i and i + 1 are active and will be undercut by smaller rivals and
undercut their larger rivals. Therefore, in this range their CDFs must satisfy
i+1 + i(1  Fi(p)) =
i+1
p
; i(1  Fi+1(p)) =
i
p
: (23)
Since Fi+1(pi) = 0 it follows that
i = ipi :
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An intermediate rm i, where 2  i  n   1, is active in both the intervals [pi 1; pi]
and [pi; pi+1], and its CDF Fi needs to be continuous across the threshold price pi. At the
price pi we therefore require that
i 1
i 1pi
= 1  Fi(pi) = 1
i

i+1
pi
  i+1

; (24)
where in the case of i = 2 we have written 1 = 1. If we write pn = 1 then we have
i = ipi for all rms 1  i  n, and so for 2  i  n 1 expression (24) entails expression
(9). This is a second-order di¤erence equation in pi where p1 is free, p2 is given in (22),
and the terminal condition pn = 1 serves to pin down p1. It is clear from (22) and (9) that
the sequence p1; p2; p3; ::: is an increasing sequence of price thresholds. This completes the
description of the candidate equilibrium.
We next show that no rm has an incentive to deviate from its described strategy. By
construction, rm i is indi¤erent between choosing any price in the interval [pi 1; pi+1],
assuming its rivals follow the stated strategies. We need to check that a rms prot is no
higher if it chooses a price outside this interval. Consider rst an upward price deviation,
which is only relevant if i < n  1. If i < n  2 and rm i chooses a price above pi+2 is has
no demand since rm i+ 1 is sure to set a lower price and all rm is potential customers
also consider rm (i + 1)s price. Suppose then that i < n   1 and rm i chooses a price
p 2 [pi+1; pi+2], in which case it has demand i if its price is below the prices of both rivals
i+ 1 and i+ 2. Therefore, from (23) its prot with such a price is
pi[1  Fi+1(p)][1  Fi+2(p)] =
ii+1
2i+1

i+2
p
  i+2

= pi+1
ii+2
i+1

pi+2
p
  1

:
This prot decreases from i = ipi at p = pi+1 to zero at p = pi+2. We deduce that rm
i cannot increase its prot by choosing a price above pi+1.
Next consider a downward price deviation, so that rm i chooses a price below pi 1
(which is only relevant when i > 2). Suppose that this rm chooses a price in the interval
[pj; pj+1], where j  i  2. The rm will undercut all rms larger than rm j + 1, and so
obtain demand at least j+2 + ::: + i. It will also serve the segment j+1 if it undercuts
rm j + 1 and it will additionally serve the segment j if it undercuts both rms j and
j + 1. Putting this together implies that the rms prot with price p 2 [pj; pj+1] is
p

j+2 + :::+ i + (1  Fj+1(p))(j+1 + j(1  Fj(p))
	
: (25)
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Given the CDFs in (23), this prot is a convex function of p and so must be maximized in
this range either at pj or at pj+1. Therefore, we can restrict our attention to deviations by
rm i > 2 to the threshold prices fp1; p2; :::; pi 2g. If it chooses price pj where 2  j  i 2,
expression (25) implies its prot is
pj

j+1 + :::+ i + j(1  Fj(pj))
	
:
Expression (24) implies that j(1   Fj(pj)) is equal to j+1(pj+1pj   1), in which case the
above deviation prot with price pj is
pj

j+1 + :::+ i + j+1(
pj+1
pj
  1)

= j+1pj+1 + (j+2 + :::+ i)pj : (26)
One can check that expression (26) holds also for j = 1. We need to show that (26) is no
higher than rm is equilibrium prot, which is i = ipi. We do this in two steps: (i) we
show that (26) is increasing in j given i, so that j = i   2 is the most tempting of these
deviations for rm i, and (ii) we show (26) is below ipi when j = i  2.
To show (i), suppose that i  4, which is the only relevant case, and suppose that
1  j  i  3. Then rm is deviation prot with price pj+1 from (26) is
j+2pj+2 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1 = j+1pj + j+2pj+1 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1
 j+1pj + j+2pj+1 + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1   (j+2   j+1)(pj+1   pj)
= j+1pj+1 + j+2pj + (j+3 + :::+ i)pj+1  j+1pj+1 + (j+2 + :::+ i)pj
where the nal expression is the rms deviation prot with price pj, which proves claim
(i). (Here, the rst equality follows from (9), the rst inequality follows from (8) and the
fact that fpjg is an increasing sequence, while the nal inequality follows from fpjg being
an increasing sequence.)
To show claim (ii), suppose that i  3 which is the only relevant case, and observe that
ipi = i 1pi 2 + ipi 1
 i 1pi 2 + ipi 1   (i   i 1)(pi 1   pi 2)
= i 1pi 1 + ipi 2
where the nal expression is (26) when j = i  2. (Here, the rst equality follows from (9)
and the inequality follows from fig being an increasing sequence.) This completes the
proof that the stated strategies constitute an equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
First consider the situation where 123 > jt1   t2j, so that either part (i) or (ii) applies,
in which case we will construct an equilibrium where each rm chooses the lowest price
p0 = 1=1 and rm is prot is i = ip0.
Note that demand (10) can be written in the form
qi(p) = i +
1

[(1  Fj(p)) + ik][(1  Fk(p)) + ij]  ijik

;
and so the equilibrium condition pqi(p)  i = ip0 for prices in rm is support can be
expressed in the factorized form
zi(p) = [(1  Fj(p)) + ik][(1  Fk(p)) + ij] ; (27)
where we have written
zi(p)  

i
p0
p
  i

+ ijik = ( + ij)( + ik)  i

1  p0
p

: (28)
Here, zi(p) is a decreasing function of p and zi(1) > 0, so zi(p) is positive throughout the
range [p0; 1]. Note that the rm with the smallest zi=i is the rm with the largest ti
in (11). In particular, (27) implies that for a price in the support of all three rms the
function [(1  Fi(p)) + jk]zi(p) is the same for each rm, and rm is CDF satises
[1  Fi(p)] + jk =
s
zj(p)zk(p)
zi(p)
: (29)
(As required, Fi(p0) = 0 for each rm.) Dene the functions from (29):
i(p) = 1 
1

"s
zj(p)zk(p)
zi(p)
  jk
#
: (30)
When these functions are increasing, they will be the CDFs Fi(p) used in the range
where all rms are active. However, there are circumstances covered by part (ii) of
this proposition where one of these i can decrease, when we will need to ironi to
make it a valid CDF.
Di¤erentiating i in (30) yields
0i(p) =  
1
2
s
zj(p)zk(p)
zi(p)

z0j
zj
+
z0k
zk
  z
0
i
zi

=
p0
2p2
s
zj(p)zk(p)
zi(p)

j
zj
+
k
zk
  i
zi

; (31)
31
where the second equality follows from (28). It follows that if 0i(p) is zero or negative it
must be the rm with the largest i=zi, i.e. the largest ti. At a price p such that 
0
i(p) = 0
we have
i
zi
=
j
zj
+
k
zk
;
in which case di¤erentiating (31) shows that 00i at this price has the sign of
 j
z2j
z0j  
k
z2k
z0k +
i
z2i
z0i =
p0
p2

2j
z2j
+
2k
z2k
  
2
i
z2i

=
p0
p2
"
2j
z2j
+
2k
z2k
 

j
zj
+
k
zk
2#
< 0
so that i is single-peaked in price, while j and k are everywhere increasing in price.
Note that condition (15) is equivalent to
12z3(1)  13z2(1) : (32)
We claim that there exists a unique price p1 2 (p0; 1] such that 3(p1) = 1. To see this,
consider the continuous function
(p)  z1(p)z2(p)  212z3(p) ; (33)
which satises (p0) > 0  (1). (Since z1(1) = 1213, the latter inequality follows from
(32) and is strict if that inequality is strict.) Therefore, there exists a price p1 2 (p0; 1]
that satises (p1) = 0, which by (30) is equivalent to 3(p1) = 1. There can be no other
root of  in (p0; 1] since p2(p) is quadratic in p and so has no more than two roots, and
having two roots in (p0; 1] is not compatible with (p0) > 0  (1). Therefore there is a
unique p1 in (p0; 1] where (p1) = 0 and for p in that range (p) has the sign of (p1   p).
(i) Now suppose that (16) holds, in which case we construct an equilibrium of the stated
form where rms 1 and 2 choose prices in [p0; 1] and rm 3 chooses price in [p0; p1]. At
price p1 where  = 0, expression (30) implies for i; j 2 f1; 2g with i 6= j that
1  i(p1) =
1


zj(p1)
12
  j3

=
1
12

jp0
p1
  j

(34)
 aj
12

1
p1
  1

 0 :
32
We have 0i(p1)  0 in (31), in which case i is increasing in the range [p0; p1], if and only
if
0 

j
zj
+
3
z3
  i
zi

z1z2 = jzi + 3
2
12   izj ;
where the equality follows from (p1) = 0. Since izj   jzi = ( + 12)(ti   tj), this is
equivalent to the condition
123   + 12
12
(ti   tj) : (35)
Therefore if (16) holds the three CDFs Fi = i in (30) increase from zero in the range
[p0; p1], where F3(p1) = 1 and F1(p1)  1 and F2(p1)  1.
For prices above p1 rms 1 and 2 compete alone, always being undercut by rm 3.
Therefore, in the range [p1; 1] their two CDFs satisfy
1 + 12(1  F2(p)) = 1p0
p
; 2 + 12(1  F1(p)) = 2p0
p
: (36)
From (34) these CDFs join continuously at p = p1 with F1 and F2 in the lower range
[p0; p1], and are increasing in the range [p1; 1] such that F2(1) = 1 and rm 1 has an atom
at p = 1 with probability 1  F1(1) = 112 (2 11   2)  0.
The nal requirement for this to constitute an equilibrium is that rm 3 does not wish
to set a price above p1 (if p1 < 1). If it did so its prot would be
p f3 + 13(1  F1(p)) + 23(1  F2(p)) + (1  F1(p))(1  F2(p))g ;
where F1 and F2 are given in (36), which is a convex function of p since the coe¢ cient on
1=p is positive. Therefore, if rm 3 has no incentive to choose the price p = 1 it also has
no incentive to choose any price in (p1; 1). Firm 1s atom at p = 1 is 112 (2
1
1
 2), which
from (32) is no greater than 1
13
(3
1
1
  3). Therefore, rm 3s prot if it chooses p = 1
does not exceed
3 + 13

1
13
(3
1
1
  3)

= 3p0
which is the rms prot in the candidate equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose next that (17) holds. Since (16) no longer holds, expression (35) shows
that 0i(p1) < 0 for the rm i = 1; 2 which has the higher ti. We claim that i(p1) > 0 if
and only if ti tj
12
< 3. To see this, note from (34) that i(p1) > 0 if and only if
p0
p1
<
12 + j
j
() ( jp0
12 + j
) > 0 ;
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where the equivalence comes from (p) in (33) having the sign of (p1   p) for p 2 (p0; 1].
By using the right-hand expression for z in (28), and noting that when p = jp0
12+j
we have
1  p0
p
= ti
12
, we obtain
(
jp0
12 + j
) = 12
 + j3
j
[tj   ti + 123] ;
which yields the claim.
Since i(p1) > 0, let p^ be the unique price in (p0; p1) such that i(p^) = i(p1). This
price is unique since i is a single-peaked function, and i is increasing in the range [p0; p^].
Expression (34) implies that i(p1) and j(p1) are both below 1 while by construction
3(p1) = 1. Since only i can be non-monotonic, all three  functions in (30) are increasing
and below 1 in the range [p0; p^], and these functions comprise the equilibrium CDFs in this
price range.
In the intermediate price range [p^; p1] only rms j and 3 are active, and are undercut
by rm i with probability i(p^) = i(p1). Therefore, from (10) the CDFs Fj and F3 in this
range satisfy
j + ij(1  i(p^)) + j3(1  F3(p)) + (1  i(p^))(1  F3(p)) = j
p0
p
(37)
3 + i3(1  i(p^)) + j3(1  Fj(p)) + (1  i(p^))(1  Fj(p)) = 3
p0
p
: (38)
These functions are increasing in p, and at p = p1 they coincide with j and 3 in (30),
which we know satisfy j(p1)  1 and 3(p1) = 1.
The remainder of the proof closely follows that for part (i). For prices in the range
[p1; 1], only rms 1 and 2 are active, and their CDFs are given by (36), which again join up
correctly across the threshold p = p1. It remains to show that rm 3 does not wish to set
a price above p1 (if p1 < 1) and that rm i does not wish to set a price in the intermediate
range [p^; p1]. The rst of these requirements is satised as in the proof of part (i). For the
second, rm is prot with a price in [p^; p1] would be
p fi + i3(1  F3(p)) + ij(1  Fj(p)) + (1  Fj(p))(1  F3(p))g ;
where Fj and F3 are given in (38)(37). This deviation prot is again convex in p, and by
construction it is equal at the endpoints p = p^ and p = p1. Therefore, this prot cannot
be higher in the interior of [p^; p1], which completes the proof for part (ii).
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(iii) The principal part of the proof of this nal part of the proposition consists of
demonstrating the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose that rm i has the highest t in (11) and that the two remaining rms
satisfy j  k. Then if
ijk  ti   tj ; (39)
there are prices p0 and p1, with p0 < p1  1, such that it is an equilibrium for rms j and
k to choose prices in the lower range [p0; p1] and for rms i and j to choose prices in the
upper range [p1; 1].
Proof of Lemma 2: There are two subcases to prove, depending on which of rms i and
j has an atom at p = 1. Suppose rst that it is rm i which has the atom at p = 1, and
so has prot i = i. Since rms j and k have p0 as their minimum price in the proposed
equilibrium, their prots are j = jp0 and k = kp0. In the candidate equilibrium rms
j and k will undercut rm i in the range [p0; p1], and from (10) their CDFs satisfy
j + ij + (jk + )(1  Fk(p)) = j p0
p
; (40)
k + ik + (jk + )(1  Fj(p)) = k p0
p
: (41)
Here, since k  j we see that Fk reaches 1 before Fj does. Since rm ks maximum price
in this candidate equilibrium is p1, (40) implies that p0 and p1 are related by
j + ij = j
p0
p1
(42)
(so that p1 > p0).
For prices in the upper range [p1; 1] rms i and j compete and are sure to be undercut
by rm k, so their CDFs satisfy
i + ij(1  Fj(p)) = i
p
; j + ij(1  Fi(p)) = j p0
p
: (43)
Here, (42) implies that Fi(p1) = 0 as required, and we also have Fj(1) = 1. In order for
Fj() to be continuous at the threshold price p1, we require that
1
jk + 

k
p0
p1
  k   ik

=
1
ij

i
p1
  i

:
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From (42), this implies that the minimum price is p0 = P where
P =
i(j + ij)
ij + ij(j   k) ; (44)
which in turn implies that
p1 =
ij
ij + ij(j   k) :
(Note that the denominator in these expressions is positive given k  j, and we have
p0 < p1  1 where p1 = 1 if j = k.) In this candidate equilibrium we require that rm
i is willing to price all the way up to p = 1, i.e., that Fi(1)  1, which from (43) requires
that
P  j
j
:
There are two possible deviations that we need to check are unprotable to make this
an equilibrium. First, rm i cannot have an incentive to choose a low price in [p0; p1).
Using the convexity argument at the end of the proof for part (i), it su¢ ces to check it is
not protable for it to choose the lowest price p0 = P . Since its prot at price P is iP ,
we require that P  i=i, which is equivalent to condition (39).
Second, if p1 < 1 we need to check that rm k does not have an incentive to choose a
high price in (p1; 1]. Again, its prot is convex in p in this range, and so it has no such
incentive provided that its prot at p = 1 is no higher than kP . But its prot at p = 1
is k + ik(1  Fi(1)), which is no greater than k + ik, and so a su¢ cient condition for
this deviation to be unprotable is that kP  k + ik. But
kP   (k + ik) = j   k(1  P )  (j + ij)
= j   k(1  P )  (j + ij
i
(j   k))P
= (j   k)(1  i + ij
i
P )
 (j   k)(1  i + ij
i
)  0 :
Here, the second equality follows from the denition of P in (44), while the rst inequality
follows from P  i=i which is equivalent to (39).
The second sub-case in the lemma has rm j with the atom at 1, so that j = j, which
implies the minimum price is p0 = j=j, in which case (40) implies that the threshold
price where rm k drops out is p1 =
j
j+ij
. For rm k to drop out before rm j, we again
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require that k  j. If i denotes rm is prot, in the range [p1; 1] the CDFs need to
satisfy
i + ij(1  Fj(p)) = i
p
; j + ij(1  Fi(p)) = j
p
: (45)
(Note that Fi = 0 at p1 and Fi = 1 at p = 1, as required.) For Fj to be continuous at the
threshold price p1 =
j
j+ij
we require
1
jk + 

k
j
(j + ij)  k   ik

=
1
ij

j + ij
j
i   i

:
Noting that the left-hand side above is simply (j   k)=j, this condition requires that
i =
ij
jP
; (46)
where P was given in (44). For rm i not to want to choose the minimum price p0 = j=j
we require
ij
jP
 ij
j
so that P  i=i which is equivalent to (39). For rm j to be willing to price up to 1 in
(45) we require that i  i, which from (46) requires that
P  j
j
:
The nal condition to check is that rm k has no incentive to set a high price. Firm
ks prot in this candidate equilibrium is kj=j, and if it chooses p = 1 it obtains prot
k + jk(1  Fj(1)). Therefore, we require that
k
j
j
  k  jk(1  Fj(1)) = ijk
ij

j
jP
  1

=
jk
j + ij
(j   i   kj
j
) (47)
where the rst equality follows from (45). This inequality holds since
(j + ij)(k
j
j
  k)  jk(j   i   kj
j
)
= (j   )kj
j
  jk(j   i)  k(j + ij)
 jk   (jk + )(j   i)  k(j + ij)
= jik + i(jk + )  kij  jik  0 :
Here, the rst inequality uses the implication of P < j=j that j   i  k jj (which
can be seen from the nal equality in (47).) The second inequality uses assumption (39).
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In sum, provided that condition (39) holds, we have found the desired equilibrium. If
P in (44) is above j=j then rm i has the atom at p = 1 and minimum price o¤ered by
rms j and k is equal to P . If P is below j=j then it is rm j which has the atom at
p = 1, and the minimum price o¤ered by rms j and k is equal to j=j. This completes
the proof of the lemma.
Now return to the proof of part (iii), so that rms 1, 2 and 3 are as described in the
statement of the Proposition and (18) holds. First suppose that t2  t1, so that (18) entails
t2 > t1 + 123. Then we claim that 3  1. For if not we would have t2   t1  123
and t1   t2  12(2   1), where the second inequality follows since
t1 t2 = (2 2 12)1 (1 1 12)2 = (1+12)2 (2+12)1  12(2 1) ;
where the nal inequality is due to the assumption that rm 1 has the highest captive-to-
reach ratio. These two inequalities imply
1  2 + 3  2 + 1
if 3  1, which is a contradiction. Therefore, since 3  1 we have
t2 > t1 + 123 = t1 + t3   3  t1 + t3   1 = 231 + t3  t3 :
Therefore, rm 2 has the largest t of all three rms and 3  1, and so we can apply
Lemma 1 (with i = 2, j = 1 and k = 3 in the statement of Lemma 2).
Second suppose instead that t1  t2, so that (18) entails t1  t2 + 123. Again, if
3  2 the same argument as above shows that t1  t3, and Lemma 1 applies (with i = 1,
j = 2 and k = 3 in the statement of the lemma). The remaining case has 3  2. Note
that for any i and j we have
ti   tj + ij(i   j) = ij(i   j) ; (48)
and using this implies that
t1   t3 = 13

13
13
(1   3) + 3   1

 13

12
12
(1   2) + 3   1

= 13

1   2 + t1   t2
12
+ 3   1

 13 (23   2)  132 :
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(Here, the rst inequality follows from (15), the second equality follows from (48), the
second inequality follows from assumption t1  t2 + 123, and the nal inequality follows
since 3  2.) Therefore t1   t3  132, and in particular t1 is the largest t. Thus the
conditions of Lemma 2 are satised (with i = 1, j = 3 and k = 2 in the statement of
the lemma), and rm 2 operates only in the lower range while rm 3 uses the full range.
Regardless of whether rm 1 or rm 2 has the larger ti, one can check the the minimum
price p0 in the lemma is weakly below rm 1s captive-to-reach ratio. This completes the
proof of part (iii).
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) First suppose that 3  , in which case the discussion in the text shows that each
rms supply is (19) and each rm has the same minimum price p0 in (21) and rm i makes
prot i = ip0. The CDFs which support this equilibrium are derived as follows. With
supply given by (19) and prot i = ip0, a price p in rm is support satises
Fj(p)Fk(p) = i

1  p0
p

: (49)
For a price p in all three supports, iFi(p) must be the same for all rms, and equal to
iFi(p) =
s
123


1  p0
p

: (50)
Here, all CDFs are zero at p = p0 and are increasing functions of p above p0. Firm 3 has
the largest F in (50) and F3(p) reaches 1 at the price p1 given by
p1 =
p0
1   3
12
=
1   1
1
1   3
12
:
Note that p1  1 above, with strict inequality if 2 > 3.
If 2 = 3 (but still assuming 3  ) then p1 = 1, and the equilibrium involves each
rms CDF being given by (50) throughout the range [p0; 1]. Here, F2(p)  F3(p) and
F2(1) = F3(1) = 1, while rm 1 has an atom at p = 1 with probability 1 21 .
If 3 < 2 (but still assuming 3  ) then p1 < 1 and above p1 the two largest rms
compete as duopolists, sure to be undercut by rm 3. From (49) their CDFs satisfy
1F1(p) = 2F2(p) =
12


1  p0
p

: (51)
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Therefore, F2(1) = 1 while rm 1 has an atom with probability 1 21 at p = 1. The nal
condition to check is that rm 3 does not wish to deviate to a high price p > p1. If it did
so, (51) implies that its change in prot would be
p[3   F1(p)F2(p)]  p03 =

1  p0
p

3p  12

(p  p0)

:
However, the term [] is zero at p = p1 and decreasing in p since
12   3 = (1   3)(2   3) + 3(1  23) > 0 :
(Here, 1  23 > 0 since we have 2 + 3 < 1.) This completes the proof of part (i) except
for the case where 3 = 2 and 3 < , which we deal with later.
(ii) Now suppose that 3 < , so that the smallest rm has no captive customers.
We divide the proof into two subcases, depending on whether or not rm 2 has captive
customers. Suppose rst that rms 1 and 2 have captive customers but rm 3 does not, so
3 <   2  1. (In particular, we cannot have 3 = 2 in this case.) Then (20) entails
si(p) = i(1  Fj(p)) + (1  j   3F3(p))Fj(p) = i   Fj(p)(  3(1  F3(p))) (52)
for i; j = 1; 2 and
s3(p) = 3(1  F1(p)F2(p)) : (53)
We claim in this case that there is an equilibrium where rms 1 and 2 choose prices in
the range [p0; 1] and have prot i = ip0, where p0 is given by (21), and where rm 3
only chooses price in an interior interval [p^; p1], where p0 < p^ < p1 < 1, and obtains prot
3 > 3 > 3p0.
Since psi(p) = i = ip0 for i = 1; 2, where si is given in (52), we have 1F1(p) =
2F2(p). For p < p^, where rms 1 and 2 are sure to undercut rm 3, (52) implies that
1F1(p) = 2F2(p) =
12
  3

1  p0
p

: (54)
Clearly these CDFs equal zero at p = p0 and increase with p. If rm 3 did choose a price
p < p^, with the supply function in (53) its prot ps3(p) would be
p3(1  F1F2) = p3
 
1  12
(  3)2

1  p0
p
2!
; (55)
where the equality follows from (54), and the derivative of this prot is proportional to
(  3)2   12
 
1 

p0
p
2!
(56)
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which is decreasing in p and positive at p = p0. Since p0 < 1 21 , a su¢ cient condition for
(56) to be strictly negative at p = 1 is
12
 
1 

1  2
1
2!
  (  3)2 > 0 :
But the left-hand side of this can be written
12
 
1 

1  2
1
2!
  (  3)2 =   3
1
(2(1 + 1   2)  1(1 + 2   1))
=
  3
1
(2(1  2) + 1(1  1)) > 0 :
We deduce that there is a unique p^ 2 (p0; 1) such that (56) is equal to zero, which is
therefore given by
p^ =
p0q
1  ( 3)2
12
: (57)
(The previous inequality shows that the root in the denominator is real.) Since p^ will be
the smallest price in rm 3s support, this rms prot will be equal to its prot at p = p^,
which from (55)(57) is
3 = p^3
 
1  12
(  3)3

1  p0
p^
2!
= p^3
 
1  12
(  3)3
 
1 

p0
p^
2! 1  p0
p^
1 + p0
p^
!
= p^3
 
1  1 
p0
p^
1 + p0
p^
!
=
23
1
p0
+ 1
p^
=
2p03
1 +
q
1  ( 3)2
12
: (58)
By construction, rm 3s prot would be lower than 3 if it chose a price below p^.
Turn next to the range for prices where all three rms are active, p 2 [p^; p1]. Using the
observation that 1F1 = 2F2, with supply functions (52)-(53) the solution to psi(p) = i
for i = 1; 2; 3 is
1F1(p) = 2F2(p) =
s
12

1  3
p3

(59)
and
3(1  F3(p)) =  

1  p0
p
s
12
1  3
p3
: (60)
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Using the rst line in (58), we see that F3(p^) = 0 and that F1 and F2 join up continuously
on either side of the threshold price p^. Expression (59) implies that F1 and F2 are increasing
in p in [p^; p1]. From (60), F3(p) is increasing if (1   p0p )=
q
1  3
p3
is increasing, which is
the case if
3
3

1
p0
+
1
p

 2 ;
which holds for all p  p^ if it holds at p^. However, from (58) this inequality holds with
equality at p^, and so F3 in (60) is an increasing function for p  p0. (In particular, the
density for rm 3s price is zero at p = p^.)
Evaluating Fi at p = 1 in (59) and (60) reveals that F1(1) < 1, F2(1) < 1 and F3(1) > 1.
That this is so for F1 is clear, while to show this for F2 note that 1  F2(1) has the sign
2   1

1  3
3

> 2   1 (1  p0)  2   1

1 

1  2
1

= 0 :
(Here, the rst inequality follows since 3 > 3p0 and the second follows since p0 =
1 =1  1 2=1.) Finally, observe that 1 F3(1) in (60) has the sign of

1  3
3

1 2,
which by the above argument is negative as required. Firm 3s maximum price, p1 < 1,
therefore satises F3(p1) = 1, or
1  p0
p1
s
12
1  3
p13
=  : (61)
The remaining region is where p > p1, when rms 1 and 2 are sure to be undercut by
rm 3, when we again have F1 and F2 given by (51). By construction, these two CDFs
join up continuously on either side of the price p1 and they are increasing in p for p  p1.
As in the regime where all rms had captive demand, rm 1 has an atom at p = 1 with
probability 1 2
1
.
The nal condition to check is that rm 3 has no incentive to choose a price above p1.
Similarly to (55), rm 3s prot with price p  p1 is given by
p3(1  F1F2) = p3
 
1  12
2

1  p0
p
2!
;
where the equality follows from (51). As in (56), the derivative of rm 3s prot is propor-
tional to
2   12
 
1 

p0
p
2!
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which decreases with p. Therefore, if the above expression is negative at p = p1 rm 3 has
no incentive to choose a price above p1. However, this expression at p = p1 has the sign of
1  12
2
 
1 

p0
p1
2!
= 1  12
2

1  p0
p1
2
p1 + p0
p1   p0
= 1  p1 + p0
p1   p0

1  3
3p1

=
p0
p1   p0

3
3

1
p0
+
1
p1

  2

<
p0
p1   p0

3
3

1
p0
+
1
p^

  2

= 0 :
Here, the second equality follows since rm 3s prot is equal to 3 at p = p1, while the
nal equality follows from (58).
The second subcase for part (ii) is when only rm 1 has captive consumers, so that
3  2 <  < 1. In this case (20) implies
s1(p) = 1   (  2)F3(p)  (  3)F2(p)  (1  1)F2(p)F3(p) ;
while for i; j = 2; 3 we have
si(p) = i   [  j + (1  1)Fj(p)]F1(p) :
We will construct an equilibrium where rms 1 and 2 choose prices in the range [p0; 1] and
have prot i = ip0, where p0 is given by (21). With prots i = ip0, the equilibrium
condition psi(p) = i with the above supply functions implies that for p in 1s price support
1

1  p0
p

= (  3)F2 + (  2)F3 + (1  1)F2F3 ;
which can be written in the factorized form
1(1 1)

1  p0
p

+ ( 2)( 3) = [ 3+ (1 1)F3][ 2+ (1 1)F2)] : (62)
For rm 2 we have
2

1  p0
p

= [  3 + (1  1)F3]F1 ; (63)
while for rm 3 we have
3   3
p
= [  2 + (1  1)F2)]F1 (64)
where 3 is to be determined.
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First consider the loose end from part (i) where 2 = 3 =  say and  < . Then we
claim that the equilibrium has 1 = 1p0, 2 = 3 = p0 and F2 = F3 = F say. From (62),
F satises
[  + (1  1)F (p)]2 = 1(1  1)

1  p0
p

+ (  )2 ;
which implies that F (p) is an increasing function of p with F (p0) = 0 and F (1) = 1.
Expression (63) then implies
F1(p) = 
1  p0
pr
1(1  1)

1  p0
p

+ (  )2
= 
vuut 1  p0p
1(1  1) + ( )21  p0
p
which is increasing in p and satises F1(0) = 0 and F1(1) = =1 (where the latter point
is most easily seen from (63) using the fact F (1) = 1). This completes the loose end from
part (i).
Now suppose that 3 < 2. We claim there is again an equilibrium of the stated form.
For p < p^, where rms 1 and 2 are sure to undercut rm 3, the two CDFs again are given
by (54). If rm 3 deviated to a price p < p^, from (64) its prot would be
y(p)  p(3   [  2 + (1  1)F2]F1) ;
where the CDFs are as in (54). We can express this prot y(p) compactly as
y(p) = bp0   ap  c
p
p20 ;
with the positive constants given by
c =
(1  1)12
(  3)2 ; a =

1  (  3)(2   3)
12

c ; b = 3 + a+ c :
Then
y0(p) = c

p0
p
2
  a (65)
which is positive at p = p0 and decreasing in p. Since p0 < 1 21 , a su¢ cient condition for
y0(1) < 0 is
c

1  2
1
2
  a < 0, 1 

1  2
1
2
  (  3)(2   3)
12
> 0 :
However, the right-hand side can be written as
1 

1  2
1
2
  (  3)(2   3)
12
=
  3
212
(2(1  2) + 13) > 0 :
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Therefore, there is a unique price p^ 2 (p0; 1) which makes the derivative zero in (65), and
this is given by
p^ = p0
r
c
a
=
p0q
1  ( 3)(2 3)
12
: (66)
Since p^ will be the smallest price in rm 3s support, this rms prot will be equal to its
prot at p = p^, which is
3 = y(p^) =
"
3 + c

1 
r
a
c
2#
p0 (67)
so that
3 =

3 +
1  1
(  3)2
p
12  
p
12   (  3)(2   3)
2
p0 : (68)
Consider next the region p^  p  p1 where all three rms are active. From (62) we see
that (63) and (64) imply that
F1(p) =
vuuut k2

3   3p

1(1  1) + ( 2)( 3)1  p0
p
; (69)
which increases with p. Expressed in terms of F1 in (69) the other two CDFs in (63)-(64)
are given by
F2(p) = 1  3
1  1
241 

1  3
p3

F1(p)
35 (70)
and
F3(p) = 1  2
1  1
241 

1  p0
p

F1(p)
35 : (71)
Since 3
3
 p0, it follows that if F 03(p)  0 then F 02(p)  0. Expression (71) implies that
F3 is increasing if and only if (1  p0=p)=F1(p) increases with p. From (69), which can be
written in the modied form
F1(p) =
vuuut (1  p0p )

1  3
3p

1  1(1 1)
23
p0(
1
p
  1)
; (72)
and taking logs, one sees that the derivative of (1  p0=p)=F1(p) has the sign of
1
1  p0
p
+
(1 1)1
23
1  (1 1)1
23
p0

1
p
  1
  3p03
1  3
p3
=
(1 1)1
23
1  (1 1)1
23
p0

1
p
  1
  33p0   1
1  3
p3

1  p0
p
 :
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From (72) this has the sign of
(1  1)1
2
F 21 (p) 

3
p0
  3

: (73)
This increases with p, and so F3(p) is increasing for p  p^ provided that (73) is non-negative
at p = p^. Since F1 is continuous across the threshold p = p^, F1(p1) is given by (54), and
substituting this into (73) yields
(1  1)1
2
F 21 (p) 

3
p0
  3

= 3 +
(1  1)1
2

2
3   3

1  p0
p
2
  3
p0
= 3 + c

1  p0
p
2
  3
p0
= 3 + c

1 
r
a
c
2
  3
p0
= 0 :
Here, the nal expression is equal to zero from (67). Therefore (73) is zero at p = p^. (In
particular, we again have F 03(p^) = 0.)
Thus, all three CDFs are increasing for p  p^. Evaluating the CDFs in (69)(71) at
p = 1, and noting that 3p0 < 3 < 3, reveals that F1(1) < 1, F2(1) < 1 and F3(1) > 1.
Therefore, there exists a unique price p1 2 (p^; 1) such that F3(p1) = 1. Above p1 only rms
1 and 2 compete, and are sure to be undercut by rm 3. From (62) and (63), the two
CDFs are given by
F1(p) = 1  p0
p
; 1  F2(p) = 1
2
p0

1
p
  1

: (74)
Here, these CDFs increase with p, F2(1) = 1, while rm 1 has at atom at p = 1 with
probability p0. The nal point to check is that rm 3 has no incentive to choose a price
above p1. If it did, from (64) its prot would be
p [3(1  F1)  (1  1)F1(1  F2)] = 3p0   p(1  1)

1  p0
p

1
2
p0

1
p
  1

;
where the equality follows after substituting F1 and F2 from (74). However, since the
coe¢ cient on 1=p in this expression is now positive this is a convex function of p, and
so the rm has no incentive to choose price p < p1 provided that its prot at p = 1 is
no greater than 3. However, setting p = 1 in the prot expression yields 3p0, which is
indeed below 3. This completes the proof for part (ii).
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